Can Observing Non-Black Objects Truly Support the All Ravens Are Black Hypothesis?

The Raven Paradox, introduced by Carl Gustav Hempel in the 1940s, challenges our intuition about what constitutes evidence for a statement.

Imagine a hypothesis stating, "All ravens are black." According to the logic that underpins the Raven Paradox, observing a green apple, which is neither black nor a raven, unexpectedly provides supporting evidence for this hypothesis. This is because finding a green apple confirms the equivalent statement, "Everything that is not black is not a raven," thus seemingly lending support to the original claim about ravens' color. This example illustrates the counterintuitive nature of the paradox and the challenges it poses to our understanding of evidence and confirmation.

The paradox arises from the logical equivalence between "All ravens are black" and "All non-black things are not ravens." Surprisingly, observing a green apple (a non-black non-raven) seems to support the claim that all ravens are black. This counter-intuitive conclusion has sparked various proposed resolutions, including accepting the role of non-ravens in confirming the hypothesis, utilizing Bayesian probability to assess the significance of evidence, and exploring the impact of background knowledge on our judgments.


How do you interpret the Raven Paradox?
Do you lean towards any particular resolution or have a unique perspective on the matter?